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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel approach for intrusion detection system based on sampling with
Least Square Support Vector Machine (LS-SVM). Decision making is performed in two stages.
In the first stage, the whole dataset is divided into some predetermined arbitrary subgroups.
The proposed algorithm selects representative samples from these subgroups such that the
samples reflect the entire dataset. An optimum allocation scheme is developed based on the
variability of the observations within the subgroups. In the second stage, least square support
vector machine (LS-SVM) is applied to the extracted samples to detect intrusions. We call the
proposed algorithm as optimum allocation-based least square support vector machine (OA-
LS-SVM) for IDS. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, the experiments
are carried out on KDD 99 database which is considered a de facto benchmark for evaluating
the performance of intrusions detection algorithm. All binary-classes and multiclass are tested
and our proposed approach obtains a realistic performance in terms of accuracy and efficiency.
Finally a way out is also shown the usability of the proposed algorithm for incremental datasets.
keywords: Sampling, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Network Security, Least
Square Support Vector Machine (LS-SVM).
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness of the risk associated with network
attacks as information systems are now more open to the Internet than ever before. Intru-
sion detection system (IDS) is a program that tries to find indications that the computer
has been compromised. An IDS attempts to detect an intruder breaking into computer
system or legitimate user misuses system resources. Intrusion detection is an important
issue and has captured the attention of network administrators and security professionals.
Intrusion detection is the art of detecting unauthorized, inappropriate, or anomalous
activity on computer systems. Intrusion detection systems are classified as network based,
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host based, or application based depending on their mode of deployment and data used for
analysis [1, 35]. In addition, intrusion detection systems can also be classified as signature
based or anomaly based depending upon the attack detection method. The signature-based
systems are trained by extracting specific patterns (or signatures) from previously known
attacks while the anomaly-based systems learn from the normal data collected when there
is no anomalous activity [1, 30, 31, 32, 43]. The main purpose of an IDS is to detect as many
attacks as possible with minimum number of false alarms, i.e., the system must be accurate
in detecting attacks. However, an accurate system that cannot handle large amount of
network traffic and is slow in decision making will not fulfill the purpose of an intrusion
detection system [18]. Hence it is necessary to develop a system that detects most of the
attacks, gives very few false alarms, copes with large amount of data, and is fast enough to
make real-time decisions.
Although the IDS has led to a number of valuable network security techniques [3, 4, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 33, 40, 41, 42], the existing solutions are limited only to static data release.
That is, in such solutions it is assumed that the entire dataset is available at the time of
release. This assumption implies a significant shortcoming, as data today are continuously
collected (thus continuously grow) and there is a strong demand for up-to-date data at all
times. One possible approach is to use the intrusion detection techniques for the entire
dataset whenever the dataset is augmented with new records. In this way, researchers are
always provided with up-to-date information. Although this can be accomplished using
existing techniques, there are two significant drawbacks. First, it requires redundant com-
putation, as the entire dataset has to be analysed even if only a few records are newly
inserted. Sometimes intrusion detection techniques might not work properly due to contin-
uously growing large dataset. Secondly, huge space will be required to store all the previous
datasets that may be sometimes impossible. So it is necessary to develop an IDS system
that can be used for static as well as for incremental datasets.
In the past few years, many researches have tried to apply different techniques for
detecting intrusions. Among them, the framework of support vector machines (SVM) is
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becoming extremely popular in the field of statistical pattern classification. Least square
support vector machines (LS-SVM) are the modified version of support vector machines.
LS-SVM has been used different purposes such as for adaptive communication channel
equalization [19], to study the nonlinear time series prediction [20], on Morlet Wavelet
kernel function [21], for facial gender classification [22] and for measurement of soluble
solids content of rice vinegars [24]. Although LS-SVM is significant, it has not yet being
used for detecting intrusions. This paper proposes a LS-SVM technique in order to detect
intrusions for IDS both in static and incremental datasets.
From the pattern recognition point of view the key problem is to represent the large
amount of dataset for further analysis, such as classification. It is important to extract
useful features from the large datset and then use the extracted features for classification.
In the literature, numerous intrusion detection techniques are often employed for the feature
extraction and the classification stage. The main drawback of these methods is that they
do not work well when the data size is very large. They also require lengthy training time.
Table 1: Required sample size
Population Sample
99− 100% confidence interval
95% confidence 99% confidence
level level
100 99 99
1K 906 943
10K 4899 6247
100K 8763 14267
1M 9513 16369
10M 9595 16613
100M 9603 16638
1B 9604 16641
Observing this challenge, this paper proposes an optimum allocation-based least square
support vector machine (OA-LS-SVM) for IDS. The proposed approach uses the idea of
sampling as representative samples can describe the whole population. For a given pop-
ulation, if the sample size is adequately taken then it can tell the characteristics of the
population. Now a natural question arises, how many samples are required to describe the
whole population? The process of determining sample size used in this paper are described
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in subsection 3.1. Table 1 shows the required sample size from a specified population under
99-100% confidence interval and for both 95% and 99% confidence levels using equation 3.2
in subsection 3.1.
As shown in Table 1, the increment of the sample size is not the same as the population
size. If the population size is 100 Millions, we need a sample of size 9603 under 99-100%
confidence interval and 95% confidence level whereas we need one more sample if the pop-
ulation size is 1 Billion. Thus it is a natural expectation that the sampling process can be
used for intrusion detection for large datasets. This expectation is achieved in this paper
for detecting intrusions. The OA-LS-SVM algorithm proposed in this paper consists of the
following steps:
1. Combine the training and testing dataset and determine the required size of the
sample by using the equation 3.2 in subsection 3.1 under desired confidence interval
and confidence level.
2. Determine the size of training and testing using optimum allocation (OA) scheme as
discussed in Section 3.
3. Divide the training and testing dataset into some predetermined subgroups of ar-
bitrary instances. Using OA scheme in Section 3, select instances from each group
of training and testing dataset such that the sum of these instances is equal to the
desired sizes of respective training and testing as in Step 2.
4. The selected instances in step 3 will be used as an input set in LS-SVM to detect
different intrusions.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work on
intrusion detection system. We present a description of the proposed methodology in details
in Section 3 both for static and incremental data. Section 4 shows experimental results of
the proposed method. Finally, concluding remarks are included in Section 5.
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2 Related Work
This work is related to several topics in the area of network security in information detection
systems. Considering the risk associated with network attacks, a number of methods and
frameworks have been proposed and many systems have been developed to detect intrusions.
This section briefly discusses these techniques and framework.
Very Recently Gupta et al. [18] proposed an intrusion detection system using conditional
random fields (CRF) and Layered approach. They considered the attack categories as layers
and different features were selected for each layer. The dataset was divided into five attack
categories for training and testing purposes of each layer. The test data passed through the
cascaded layers to determine the category a record belonged to. This approach is however
effective only for the selected features but not so convincing considering all features. On
the other hand, the results from automatic feature selection is not so promising as manual
selection. Thus the feature selection is a critical issue and so the practical implementation
of this approach is limited. Data mining approaches for detecting intrusions was introduced
by Lee et al. [4, 5, 7]. It include association rules [12] and frequent episodes, which are
based on building classifiers by discovering relevant patterns of program and user behaviour.
These methods can deal with symbolic data, and the features can be defined in the form
packet and connection details. However mining of features is limited to entry level of the
packet and requires the number of records to be large and sparsely populated; otherwise,
they tend to produce a large number of rules that increase the complexity of the system
[11].
k− means [9, 34, 39] and the fuzzy c-means [10] have been applied extensively for
intrusion detection. The main drawback of these clustering based techniques are that
they are based on calculating numeric distance between the observations, and hence the
observations must be numeric and thus observations with symbolic features cannot be easily
used. On the other hand, the clustering methods consider the features independently and
are unable to capture the relationship between different features of single record, which
further degrades attack detection accuracy. Amor et al. [6] used Na¨ıve Bayes classifiers
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for intrusion detection. The authors make strict independence assumption between the
features in an observation resulting in lower attack detection accuracy when the features
are correlated, which is often the case for intrusion detection. Bayesian network [13] has
also been used for intrusion detection. This method tends to be attack specific and build
a decision network based on special characteristics of individual attacks. Thus the size of
a Bayesian network increases rapidly as the number of features and the type of attacks
modeled by a Bayesian network increases.
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) have also been applied for intrusion detection [23, 27,
29]. However, modeling the system calls alone may not always provide accurate classification
as in such cases various connection level features are ignored. Further, HMMs are generative
systems and fail to model long-range dependencies between the observations [28]. Debar
et al. [36] and Zhang et al [38] discussed the use of artificial neural networks for network
intrusion detection. The main drawback of these methods is that they require large amount
of data for training and it is hard to select best possible architecture for a neural network.
The idea of decision trees have also used for intrusion detection [6]. It generally has high
speed of operation and high attack detection accuracy. Kim et al. [17] used the support
vector machine for intrusion detection. Support vector machines (SVMs) map real valued
input feature vector to a higher dimensional feature space through nonlinear mapping and
can provide real-time detection capability, deal with large dimensionality of data, and can
be used for binary-class as well as multiclass classification.
The work presented in this paper uses the idea of least square support vector machine
(LS-SVM) which is a modified version of SVM. For large datasets, it is necessary to reduce
the dimension of the dataset and fed them to classifiers to detect intrusion. We first deter-
mine the required size to describe the characteristics of the whole dataset. Then we divide
the whole dataset into some predetermined subgroups and select sample from these clusters
using the derived optimum allocation scheme. We finally use these samples as an input set
of LS-SVM to detect different attacks in IDS. We compare our approaches with the most
recent methods of intrusion detection in the literature. The difference between the pro-
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Figure 1: General architecture of the proposed methodology 1 (OA-LS-SVM 1)
posed OA-LS-SVM approach and the other methods in the literature are as follows: First,
we develop an allocation scheme that determines the size of training and testing depending
on the variability of the data. In addition, the proposed approach easily captures large
datasets and can be used as a general framework for classification in pattern recognition.
Secondly, it selects samples from each sub-group of training and testing depending on the
variability providing a reliable means of data reduction. Finally, the proposed method can
easily be implemented for incremental large datasets.
3 Proposed Methodology
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm of the optimum allocation-based least square
support vector machine (OA-LS-SVM) for IDS. This section describes the methodology of
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Figure 2: General architecture of the proposed methodology 2 (OA-LS-SVM 2)
the proposed algorithm both for static (i.e., the entire dataset is assumed to be available
at the time of release) and for incremental datasets.
3.1 Sample Size Determination
Sample size determination is the act of choosing the number of observations to include in
a statistical sample. The size of a sample is calculated on how many samples are needed
in order to get results that reflect the target population as preciously as needed. In this
paper we determine the required sample size in estimating population proportion by using
the following popular formula as described in [2, 8, 44, 45].
n0 =
z2 ⋆ p ⋆ q
d2
(3.1)
where, n0 = desired sample size; z = standard normal deviate (Z-value) for desired con-
fidence level (e.g. 1.96 for 95% confidence level and 1.645 for 99% confidence level);
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p=assumed proportion in the target population estimated to have a particular character-
istic; q=1-p; and d= degree of accuracy desired in the estimated proportion (e.g., d=0.01
for 99-100% confidence interval).
If n0
N
is negligible (i.e, if the population size, N is very large), n0 is a satisfactory
approximation to sample size, n. If not (i.e., N is finite and small compared to n0), the
sample size n is obtained as
n =
n0
1 + (n0−1)
N
(3.2)
If the estimator p is not known, 0.50 (50%) is used, because for given values of z and
d, it produces the largest sample size. In this paper, we use p = 0.50 as sample size will be
then maximum.
3.2 Methodology for Static Data
The algorithm first selects a representative sample from the training and testing dataset
and then the selected sample will be used as an input set of LS-SVM. Depending on the
selection process, the algorithm consists of two types, namely
• OA-LS-SVM 1: After determining the sizes of training and testing using OA scheme,
select the training and testing representative samples directly from the respective
training and testing datasets.
• OA-LS-SVM 2: After determining the sizes of training and testing using OA scheme,
the training and testing datasets are divided into some predetermined sub-groups. OA
scheme will be used to determine the size of training and testing from each subgroup
such that the sum of theses sizes are equal to n. Select the required representative
sample from each subgroup of training and testing.
The general architecture of the proposed OA based on LS-SVM (OA-LS-SVM 1) is
shown in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 1, the training and testing data are combined
together. Then we use the optimum allocation (OA) scheme to determine the size of
training and testing. Then the training and testing samples are selected directly from the
respective training and testing sets. The dotted lines shows the required size of the training
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and testing. Then the classification technique will be used to detect the intrusion. Here we
use LS-SVM to detect different attacks in IDS.
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Figure 3: Block diagram of the proposed methodology for IDS in incremental datasets
On the other hand, the architecture of the proposed OA-LS-SVM 2 is ahown in Figure
2. As we can see from from Figure 2, after determining the size of training and testing, the
training and testing data are divided some subgroups of arbitrary instances (G1, G2, ..., Gk).
The OA scheme is again applied to determine the size of training and testing from each
subgroup. Then samples are selected from each subgroup both for training and testing such
that the sum of theses sizes is equal to n. Finally LS-SVM will be used to these samples
to detect different attacks in IDS.
3.3 Methodology for Incremental Data
The block diagram of the proposed OA method based LS-SVM for incremental IDS clas-
sification is shown in Figure 3. The first block of first row and first column is the input
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of initial IDS data and the data are continually increasing as shown in the first column of
Figure 3. For the initial data, a representative sample is taken by using equation 3.2 in
subsection 3.1. The obtained samples (second column of first row) is used for classification
through the LS-SVM classifier in the third block of first row. For each increment, the
sample selection consists of two steps. In the first step, the proposed approach employs a
technique to extract representative samples from the new incremental data and in the sec-
ond step a sub-samples is taken from each previously selected samples. Then the extracted
samples are used as the inputs to the LS-SVM classifier. Thus for incremental dataset, the
two steps are as follows:
• A representative sample from the new data. The sample size is determined using
equation 3.2 in subsection 3.1.
• A representative sample from previously selected samples. Suppose that previously
selected samples are considered as clusters, namely C1, C2, ..., Cr−1. Therefore, the
total sample size necessary for the rth incremental data is
n123...r + nr (3.1)
where, nr is the sample size required for r
th incremental data; n123...r =
∑r−1
i=1 n(i) ,
r = 2, 3, .....; and n(i) is the required sample size for ith cluster.
More specifically, n12 = n(1);
n123 = n(1) + n(2);
n123...r = n(1) + n(2) + ...+ n(r − 1);
3.4 Optimum Allocation Scheme
Suppose that the whole dataset consists of h subgroups. The variability of the observations
within the subgroups is an important consideration in the allocation of sample sizes: the
more homogeneous the subgroups are made, the greater will be the precision of this grouping
process. Of course, the precision of the grouping sample largely depends on the choice of
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Table 2: Size of training and testing for different pairs of attacks using OA scheme
Training Testing
DOS vs NORMAL DOS NORMAL DOS NORMAL
All features 9599 9345 6608 5709
Selected features 9580 9278 6627 5776
U2R vs NORMAL U2R NORMAL U2R NORMAL
All features 52 9345 68 5709
Selected features 52 9052 68 6002
R2L vs NORMAL R2L NORMAL R2L NORMAL
All features 1126 9345 7398 5709
Selected features 1066 9278 7458 5776
PROBE vs NORMAL PROBE NORMAL PROBE NORMAL
All features 2643 9345 2883 5709
Selected features 2643 9278 2883 5776
Table 3: NORMAL and DOS (all features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 99.92 97.58 98.67
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 99.85 97.31 98.56 79.36 5.98
Worst 99.78 96.95 98.37
Best 99.89 97.64 98.74
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 99.86 97.33 98.50 78.49 5.93
Worst 99.83 97.07 98.39
Best 99.82 97.11 98.43
CRF Avg. 99.78 97.05 98.10 256.11 64.42
Worst 99.75 96.99 98.37
Na¨ıve Best 99.40 97.00 98.20
Bays Avg. 99.32 97.00 98.17 1.79 26.28
Worst 99.30 97.00 98.10
Decision Best 99.90 97.20 98.60
Trees Avg. 99.90 97.00 98.46 6.09 9.04
Worst 99.90 96.70 98.30
the sample size, n which can be determined by using the equation 3.2 in subsection 3.1.
We would like to select sample from each subgroups such that the variance in the grouping
process is minimum.
Let yijl is the value of l
th unit of the jth variable in the ith subgroup in sample; i =
1, 2, ..., h; j = 1, 2, ..., k; and l = 1, 2, ..., ni; ni is the sample size of i
th subgroup. Yijl is the
corresponding value in the population; l = 1, 2, ..., Ni.
In order to find out the variability of mean in this grouping process, we assume that
the samples are drawn independently in different subgroups and the sample mean is an
unbiased estimator of population mean Y¯ . The mean during the grouping process is
y¯ =
∑h
i=1
∑k
j=1
∑ni
l=1 yijl
n1k + n2k + ...+ nhk
=
∑h
i=1
∑k
j=1 niy¯ij
nk
where, y¯ij is the sample mean of the j
th variable in the ith subgroup. Similarly the corre-
sponding mean from population is
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Table 4: NORMAL and DOS (selected features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 99.74 97.30 98.50
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 99.66 97.07 98.34 75.096 5.61
Worst 99.57 96.89 98.26
Best 99.66 97.31 98.47
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 99.60 96.82 98.19 77.02 5.97
Worst 99.52 96.50 98.02
Layered Best 99.99 97.12 98.53
CRF Avg. 99.98 97.05 98.50 26.59 15.17
Worst 99.97 97.01 98.48
Layered Best 99.40 97.00 98.20
Na¨ıve Avg. 99.39 97.00 98.19 0.68 6.50
Bayes Worst 99.30 97.00 98.10
Layered Best 99.90 97.30 98.60
Decision Avg. 99.90 97.10 98.50 1.31 3.87
Trees Worst 99.90 96.00 98.40
Y¯ =
∑h
i=1
∑k
j=1
∑Ni
l=1 Yijl
n1k + n2k + ...+ nhk
=
∑h
i=1
∑k
j=1NiY¯ij
nk
Thus, y¯ − Y¯ = 1
k
[
∑h
i=1
∑k
j=1
Ni
N
(y¯ij − Y¯ij)], assuming the sampling fraction is the same in
all subgroups, i.e., ni
n
= Ni
N
, where, n = n1 + n2 + ... + nh and N = N1 + N2 + ... + Nh.
Therefore the variability of the mean during the grouping process is
V (y¯) = E[y¯ − E(y¯)] = E[y¯ − Y¯ ]
=
1
k2
E[
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
Ni
N
(y¯ij − Y¯ij)]
=
1
k2
[
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
N2i
N2
E(y¯ij − Y¯ij)]
=
1
k2
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
N2i
N2
V (y¯ij) (3.1)
Here, y¯ij is the mean of the simple random sample in the j
th variable of the ith subgroup,
whose variance is given by [2]
V (y¯ij) =
Ni − ni
Ni
s2ij
ni
By substitution of this value in equation 3.1, we obtain
V (y¯) =
1
k2
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
N2i
N2
Ni − ni
Ni
s2ij
ni
(3.2)
where, Ni is the size of i
th subgroup; ni is the required sample taken from i
th subgroup; sij
is the standard deviation of the jth variable of ith subgroup; n is the total sample size in
the grouping process. Specifically, n = n1 + n2 + ...+ nh and N = N1 +N2 + ...+Nh.
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Our problem here is to see how a given total sample size, n, should be allocated among
different subgroups so that the grouping estimator, y¯ will have the smallest possible vari-
ability. Formally, the problem is to determine n1, n2, ..., nh so as to minimize, V (y¯), subject
to the constraint that the total size equals n = n1+n2+ ...+nh. This is equal to minimizing
the function
ψ = V (y¯) + λ(
h∑
i=1
ni − n)
=
1
k2
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
N2i
N2
Ni − ni
Ni
s2ij
ni
+ λ(
h∑
i=1
ni − n) (3.3)
For ni, λ being an unknown Lagrange’s multiplier. For an extremum of the function, we
have δψ
δni
= 0, and δ
2ψ
δn2i
> 0. Now differentiating the function ψ with respect to ni and
equating the derivative to 0, we have
δψ
δni
= − 1
k2
h∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
Ni − ni
Ni
s2ij
ni
+
h∑
i=1
λ = 0
⇒ ni = Ni
Nk
√
λ
√√√√
k∑
j=1
s2ij (3.4)
Summing,
∑h
i=1 ni = n =
1
kN
√
λ
∑h
i=1(Ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij). Therefore,
√
λ =
∑h
i=1(Ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij)
kNn
and putting the value of
√
λ in equation 3.4, we have
ni =
Ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij
∑h
i=1(Ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij)
× n (3.5)
For incremental dataset, Let yijl be the value of l
th unit of the jth variable in the ith cluster
in sample; i = 1, 2, ..., r − 1; j = 1, 2, ..., k; and l = 1, 2, ..., n(i);n(i) = sample size from
ith cluster. Then according to the derivation above, the required sample size n(i) for ith
cluster is
n(i) =
ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij
∑r−1
i=1 (ni
√∑k
j=1 s
2
ij)
× n123...r (3.6)
where, ni is the size of the i
th cluster; s2ij is the variance of j
th variable of ith cluster, and
n123...r is the total required size of sample from previously selected clusters.
14
Table 5: NORMAL and U2R (all features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 96.88 48.53 62.00
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 85.47 42.11 57.14 12.04 5.30
Worst 82.76 35.29 49.48
Best 100 39.71 56.85
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 95.04 38.24 54.51 11.68 5.97
Worst 89.29 38.76 52.08
Best 58.62 60.29 56.74
CRF Avg. 52.16 55.02 53.44 8.35 13.45
Worst 47.30 50.00 49.30
Na¨ıve Best 5.30 91.20 10.00
Bays Avg. 3.94 85.88 7.54 0.31 5.90
Worst 3.20 82.40 6.20
Decision Best 24.80 63.20 34.90
Trees Avg. 12.93 57.49 20.42 0.37 2.22
Worst 6.30 51.50 11.20
Table 6: NORMAL and U2R (selected features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 100 39.71 55.67
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 92.74 38.09 53.84 10.62 1.19
Worst 87.10 33.83 50.00
Best 100 39.71 56.85
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 92.17 36.44 52.17 10.68 1.20
Worst 86.21 30.88 46.15
Layered Best 58.62 60.29 56.74
CRF Avg. 52.16 55.02 53.44 0.85 2.67
Worst 47.30 50.00 49.30
Layered Best 5.30 91.20 10.00
Na¨ıve Avg. 3.94 85.88 7.54 0.25 1.83
Bayes Worst 3.20 82.40 6.20
Layered Best 24.80 63.20 34.90
Decision Avg. 12.93 57.49 20.42 0.29 0.93
Trees Worst 6.30 51.50 11.20
3.5 Least square support vector machine (LS-SVM) for binary classifica-
tion
Recently LS-SVMs are becoming increasingly popular as a powerful tool for data classi-
fication and function estimation. The LS-SVM was originally proposed by Suykens and
Vandewalle [26] and corresponds to a modified version of a support vector machine (SVM)
[51]. The LS-SVM solves a set of linear equations instead of a quadratic programming prob-
lem and all training points are used to model the LS-SVM. In this paper, for the detection
of intrusions in incremental datasets, an LS-SVM is used as a detector. The extracted
samples obtained by the OA approach are the input to the LS-SVM. The concept of the
LS-SVM is briefly introduced as follows [26]:
Consider a training set {xi, yi}i=1,2,...,N where xi is the ith input features vector of d-
dimension, and yi is the class label of xi, which is either +1 or −1. In the feature space,
the classification function can be described as
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y(x) = sign[wTφ(x) + b] (3.1)
where w is the weight vector, b is the bias term and φ(x) is nonlinear function, which is
not explicitly constructed, maps the input into higher dimensional feature space (can be
infinite dimension) [26]. The weight vector, w, and the bias term, b, need to be determined.
In order to obtain w and b, the optimization problem to be solved is as follows
Min J(w, b, e) =
1
2
wTw +
1
2
γ
N∑
i=1
e2i (3.2)
subject to the equality constraint
yi[w
Tφ(xi) + b] = 1− ei, i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.3)
Here γ is the regularization parameter, ei is the classification error variable and J is the
cost function which minimizes the classification error. The Lagrangian can be defined for
Equation 3.2 as
L(w, b, e;α) = J(w, b, e) −
N∑
i=1
αi{yi[wTφ(xi) + b]
− 1 + ei} (3.4)
where the αi(i = 1, 2, ..., N) denote Lagrange multipliers. The solution of Equation 3.4 can
be obtained by partially differentiating L with respect to w, b, ei, αi and considering the
resulting equations minimizing to zero. The detailed derivation is available in the reference
[26]. After solving Equation 3.4, the LS-SVM classifier can be obtained as
y(x) = sign(
N∑
i=1
yiαiK(x, xi) + b) (3.5)
This paper uses the radial basis function (RBF) as the kernal function, which is defined
[26] as
K(x, xi) = φ(x)
Tφ(xi) = exp(
−(||x− xi||)2
2σ2
)
where σ is the bandwidth parameter.
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Table 7: NORMAL and R2L (all features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 82.82 72.98 77.46
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 82.37 71.48 76.54 15.62 3.42
Worst 81.93 69.38 75.13
Best 84.15 72.15 77.65
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 83.45 69.88 76.93 15.53 3.40
Worst 82.40 66.38 76.09
Best 93.67 16.81 28.42
CRF Avg. 92.35 15.10 25.94 17.16 17.16
Worst 90.54 12.42 21.89
Na¨ıve Best 74.10 7.40 13.40
Bays Avg. 70.03 6.63 12.12 0.38 7.33
Worst 61.30 5.40 10.00
Decision Best 98.30 37.10 53.20
Trees Avg. 84.68 23.29 35.62 0.60 2.75
Worst 63.70 10.40 18.30
Table 8: NORMAL and R2L (selected features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 81.00 70.00 75.60
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 80.05 68.97 74.19 14.42 3.29
Worst 79.60 66.31 72.60
Best 83.85 74.48 78.84
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 83.12 70.71 76.40 15.36 3.50
Worst 81.11 68.22 74.60
Layered Best 95.84 31.67 47.52
CRF Avg. 94.70 27.08 42.08 5.30 5.96
Worst 91.37 24.98 39.23
Layered Best 88.30 7.20 13.30
Na¨ıve Avg. 81.81 6.47 11.98 0.31 2.99
Bayes Worst 78.20 4.10 7.80
Layered Best 89.70 14.50 24.90
Decision Avg. 85.48 10.39 18.43 0.036 1.53
Trees Worst 78.80 7.30 13.50
3.6 Multiclass LS-SVM Classifiers
Multiclass LS-SVM is a straightforward extension of LS-SVM proposed by Suykens and
Vandewalle [25]. This method is very popular in machine learning community because it is
nicely deals with high dimensional data and provides good generalization properties. The
method also determines the classifier architecture once kernel function and the parameters
are chosen by user [51]. In this paper we employ the Multiclass with radial basis function
(RBF) as a classifier. Consider a training set {y(i)k , xk}i=1,2,...,mk=1,2,...,N where xi is the ith input
features vector of d-dimension, and y
(i)
k is the class level of the ith class for features k. The
derivation of the multiclass LS-SVM [25] is based upon the formulation
min
wi,bi,ek,i
ℓ
(m)
LS (wi, bi, ek,i) =
1
2
m∑
i=1
wTi wi
+ γ
1
2
N∑
i=1
m∑
i=1
e2k,i (3.1)
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subject to equality constraints;
y
(1)
k [w
T
1 φ1(xk) + b1] = 1− ek,1, k = 1, ..., N
y
(2)
k [w
T
2 φ2(xk) + b2] = 1− ek,2, k = 1, ..., N
...
y
(m)
k [w
T
mφm(xk) + bm] = 1− ek,m, k = 1, ..., N
The Lagrangian can be defined for Equation 3.1 as
L(m)(wi, bi, ek,i;αk,i) = ℓ
(m)
LS −
∑
k,i
αk,i{y(i)k [wTi φi
(xk) + bi]− 1 + ek,i}
the discrimination of the Multiclass LS-SVM is obtained as below:
yi(x) = sign{
N∑
k=1
yikαkiKi(x, xk) + bi}; i = 1, 2, ...,m (3.2)
where yi(x) is the predicted class on the basis of the input index x, bi is the bias term, αij
denote Lagrange multipliers called support values, and Ki(x, xk) is the RBF kernel defined
[25] as Ki(x, x−k) = exp(−(‖ x−xk ‖)2/2σ2). There are four approaches for the multiclass
classification such as: versus One; One versus All; Minimal Output Coding (MOC); and
Error Correcting Output Codes (ECOC). The detailed description of those coding system
is available in reference [26]. In this paper, the first three classification systems are used to
compare the reliability of the proposed algorithm.
Table 9: NORMAL and PROBE (all features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 98.25 92.09 93.86
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 96.16 90.08 93.01 21.78 2.41
Worst 93.25 88.17 92.70
Best 98.30 94.00 95.73
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 97.64 90.89 94.14 22.49 2.44
Worst 96.69 89.21 93.32
Best 84.60 89.94 86.73
CRF Avg. 82.53 88.06 85.21 200.6 14.53
Worst 80.44 86.13 83.19
Na¨ıve Best 73.20 97.00 83.30
Bays Avg. 72.26 96.65 82.70 1.08 6.31
Worst 71.20 96.30 81.90
Decision Best 93.20 97.70 95.40
Trees Avg. 87.36 95.73 91.34 2.04 2.40
Worst 85.50 90.90 88.80
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Table 10: NORMAL and PROBE (selected features)
Precision Recall F -Value Train Test
(%) (%) (%) (sec.) (%)
Best 98.70 77.80 86.85
OA-LS-SVM 1 Avg. 98.30 77.28 86.50 22.66 2.56
Worst 97.72 76.38 86.12
Best 98.94 77.38 86.84
OA-LS-SVM 2 Avg. 98.43 77.15 86.50 22.69 2.58
Worst 98.06 76.90 86.31
Layered Best 89.72 98.03 93.68
CRF Avg. 88.19 97.82 92.73 6.91 2.04
Worst 82.92 96.48 89.82
Layered Best 78.80 21.30 33.60
Na¨ıve Avg. 77.23 19.57 31.22 0.45 1.13
Bayes Worst 74.70 17.00 27.70
Layered Best 87.50 97.70 92.30
Decision Avg. 87.04 97.41 91.93 0.54 1.00
Trees Worst 86.60 95.20 90.80
4 Experimental results
The objective of our experiment is to investigate the recital of our approach in terms of de-
tection accuracy and computational efficiency. In this paper the KDD 99 intrusion detection
dataset [52] is used which is based on the 1998 DARPA initiative, which provides design-
ers of intrusion detection systems (IDS) with a benchmark on which to evaluate different
methodologies. To do so, a simulation is made of a factitious military network consisting
of three target machines running various operating systems and services. Additional three
machines are then used to spoof different IP addresses to generate traffic. Finally, there is
a sniffer that records all network traffic using the TCP dump format. The total simulated
period is seven weeks. Normal connections are created to profile what is expected in a
military network and attacks fall into one of four categories:
• Denial of Service (DOS): Attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a ser-
vice, e.g., syn flood;
• Remote to Local (R2L): Attacker does not have an account on the victim machine,
hence tries to gain access, e.g., guessing password;
• User to Root (U2R): Attacker has local access to the victim machine and tries to gain
super user privileges, e.g., various “buffer over flow” attacks;
• PROBE: Attacker tries to gain information about the target host, e.g., port scanning.
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Table 11: Comparison of Results (PD)
DOS U2R R2L PROBE
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 97.30 14.08 9.46 88.03
(One vs One) FAR 0.06 0.37 0.10 1.13
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 98.50 67.16 9.61 93.93
(One vs All) FAR 0.023 0.18 0.032 3.17
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 98.08 63.89 9.60 91.20
(MOC) FAR 2.00 0.22 0.39 0.67
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 97.86 17.65 12.60 88.32
(One vs One) FAR 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.80
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 98.77 65.60 13.46 93.58
(One vs All) FAR 0.04 0.04 0.05 3.5
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 98.92 72.06 13.51 94.50
(MOC) FAR 0.74 0.15 0.30 0.60
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 89.33 61.47 68.98 93.97
(One vs One) FAR 0.07 0.003 0.05 21.42
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 97.27 66.47 70.87 90.00
(One vs All) FAR 0.045 0.007 0.028 17.82
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PD 97.40 62.50 69.65 89.46
(MOC) FAR .11 0.04 0.27 20.91
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 91.64 59.41 68.65 94.26
(One vs One) FAR 0.10 0.018 0.04 18.85
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 97.20 66.77 69.60 90.64
(One vs All) FAR 0.06 0.018 0.03 18.20
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PD 97.62 67.94 71.65 89.65
(MOC) FAR 0.16 0.04 0.34 18.43
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
KDD’ 99 PD 97.10 13.20 8.40 83.30
Winner FAR 0.30 0.003 0.005 0.60
Multi PD 97.30 29.80 9.60 88.70
Classifier FAR 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.40
Multi Layer PD 97.20 13.20 5.60 88.70
Perception FAR 0.30 0.05 0.010 0.40
Gaussian PD 82.40 22.80 9.60 90.20
Classifier FAR 0.90 0.50 0.10 11.30
K-Means PD 97.30 29.80 6.40 87.60
Clustering FAR 0.40 0.40 0.10 2.60
Nearest Cluster PD 97.10 2.20 3.40 88.80
Algorithm FAR 0.30 0.0006 0.010 0.50
Incremental Radial PD 73.00 6.10 5.90 93.20
Basis Function FAR 0.20 0.04 0.30 18.80
Leader PD 97.20 6.60 0.10 83.80
Algorithm FAR 0.30 0.03 0.003 0.30
Hypersphere PD 97.20 8.30 1.00 84.80
Algorithm FAR 0.30 0.009 0.005 0.40
Fuzzy PD 97.00 6.10 3.70 77.20
ARTMAP FAR 0.30 0.001 0.004 0.20
C4.5 PD 97.00 1.80 4.60 80.80
(Decision Trees) FAR 0.30 0.002 0.005 0.70
Nearest Neighbour with PD 97.32 64.04 2.51 86.13
Principle Component FAR 0.23 0.0001 0.001 .27
Analysis (4 axis)
Decision Trees with PD 97.58 7.02 0.070 70.40
Principle Component FAR 0.12 0.0001 0.030 0.85
Analysis (2 axis)
Support Vector PD 91.60 12.00 22.00 36.65
Machines FAR - - - -
Layered Conditional PD 97.05 55.03 15.10 88.06
Random Fields (all features) FAR - - - -
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4.1 Results for Static Data
The data set contains about five million connection records as the training data and about
two million connection records as the test data. In our experiments, we use 10% of the
total training data and 10% of the test data (with corrected labels), which are provided
separately. This leads to 494,021 training and 311,029 test instances. Each in the data set
represents a connection between two IP addresses, starting and at some well defined times
with a well-defined protocol. Further every record is represented by 41 different features
(variables). Each record represents a separate connection and is hence considered to be
independent of any other record. The training data is either labeled as NORMAL or as
one of the 24 different kinds of attack. These 24 attacks can be grouped into four classes;
Probing, DOS, R2L, and U2R. Similarly, the test data is also labeled as either NORMAL
or as one of the attacks belonging to the four attack groups. It is important to note that the
test data is not from the same probability distribution as the training data, and it includes
specific attack types not present in the training data. This makes the intrusion detection
task more realistic [52]. In this paper, the classification by the LS-SVM is carried out in
MATLAB (ver. 7.14, R2012a) using the LS-SVMlab toolbox (ver. 1.8) [53]. We perform
experiments on a desktop running with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600, CPU 3.40 GHz,and
8-Gbyte RAM under the same conditions.
For our results, we give the Precision, Recall, and F-Value as of [18] and not the accuracy
alone as with the given data set, it is easy to achieve very high accuracy by carefully selecting
the sample size. The Precision, Recall, and F-Value are defined as follows:
Precision =
TP
TP+FP
Recall =
TP
TP+FN
F-value =
(1 + β2)× Recall× Precision
β2 × (Recall+Precision)
where TP, FP, and FN are the number of True Positives, False Positives, and False Nega-
tives, respectively, and β corresponds to the relative importance of precision versus recall
and is usually set to 1.
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Table 12: Comparison of Results (PCD)
DOS U2R R2L PROBE
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 97.22 3.20 7.81 70.20
(One vs One) FAR 0.06 0.37 0.10 1.13
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 97.24 3.92 7.48 69.27
(One vs All) FAR 0.023 0.18 0.032 3.17
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 97.80 17.35 7.05 71.31
(MOC) FAR 2.00 0.22 0.39 0.67
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 97.46 5.59 11.19 77.76
(One vs One) FAR 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.80
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 97.55 4.78 11.14 75.55
(One vs All) FAR 0.04 0.04 0.05 3.5
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 98.24 16.18 10.97 73.55
(MOC) FAR 0.74 0.15 0.30 0.60
(γ = 10, σ2 = 10)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 89.20 37.24 5.80 84.29
(One vs One) FAR 0.07 0.003 0.05 21.42
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 87.60 37.35 2.65 75.67
(One vs All) FAR 0.045 0.007 0.028 17.82
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 1 PCD 97.30 32.72 3.28 75.10
(MOC) FAR .11 0.04 0.27 20.91
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 91.13 36.47 8.05 86.36
(One vs One) FAR 0.10 0.018 0.04 18.85
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 86.52 35.30 3.38 76.82
(One vs All) FAR 0.06 0.018 0.03 18.20
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
OA-LS-SVM 2 PCD 97.27 34.21 4.42 76.28
(MOC) FAR 0.16 0.04 0.34 18.43
(γ = 10, σ2 = 100)
Bernhard [47] PCD 97.10 13.2 8.4 83.30
FAR - - - -
Y.Liu [48] PCD 56.00 66.00 78.00 44.000
FAR - - - -
Kayacik [49] PCD 95.10 10.00 9.9 64.3
FAR - - - -
Ambwani [50] PCD 96.8 4.2 5.3 75
FAR - - - -
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We divide the training and testing data into different groups; DOS, U2R, R2L, PROBE
and NORMAL. The LS-SVM classifier is trained with the training set and performances
are assessed with the testing set for different pairs of the two-class data. For detecting DOS
attacks, we train and test the system with DOS and NORMAL data only. Similarly, for
detecting U2R attacks, we train and test the system with U2R and NORMAL data only.
Thus we have four pairs of binary class which are as follows:
DOS versus NORMAL
U2R versus NORMAL
R2L versus NORMAL
PROBE versus NORMAL
We combine the training and testing for each of the pairs and determine the total sample
size required that describe the characteristics of training and testing. As mentioned before
we use equation 3.2 of subsection 3.1 to determine the sizes using 99% confidence level and
99%-100% confidence interval. The determination of training and testing set are discussed
in Section 3.2. As indicated by Gupta et.al [18] selected features may be useful for detecting
certain type of attack. Thus we compare our results with the selected features as well. Table
2 presents the required size of training and testing for all features as well as for selected
features using the OA scheme as described in Section 3.4. It should be noted that the
training and testing for U2R attack is very small and thus we consider all of these instances
for classification. For PROBE attack we determine the size training and testing considering
each feature separately and then take the average. We perform 10 experiments for each
attack class by randomly selecting data corresponding to that attack class and normal data
only and recorded best, average and worst value. We compare our results with Conditional
Random Field (CRF), Na¨ıve Bayes and Decision Trees. The Precision, Recall and F-value
for these algorithms for the KDD 99 dataset are quoted from [18].
4.1.1 Detecting DOS attack
As discussed in Section 3.2, using OA scheme we randomly select 9345 NORMAL records
and 9599 DOS records from the training data as the training for detecting DOS attacks.
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Using the same scheme, we randomly select 5709 NORMAL and 6608 records from the test
data for testing. Hence, we have 18,944 training instances and 12,317 testing instances.
Table 3 gives the results for the experiment. In this paper, the stability of performance of
the proposed OA-LS-SVM classifier is assessed based on different statistical measurements,
such as Precision, Recall and F value. The RBF kernel function is employed for the LS-
SVM as an optimal kernel function over different kernel functions that were tested. The
LS-SVM has two important parameters γ and σ2, which should be appropriately chosen
for achieving the desired performance. In order to obtain the best results, the LS-SVM
is trained with different combinations of the parameters γ and σ2. For detecting DOS
attack, the optimal detection results are obtained for OA-LS-SVM 1 and OA-LS-SVM 2
as γ = 1000 and σ2 = 10 and γ = 10 and σ2 = 10 respectively. We observe that the
OA-LS-SVM 2 takes only 5.93 seconds to label all the test instances. We further observe
that F-value is higher for OA-LS-SVM 1, Recall is higher for OA-LS-SVM 2 and Precision
is higher for Decision Trees. Thus from this experiment, we conclude that the OA-LS-SVMs
are better choice for detecting DOS attack. The highest average values of Precision, Recall
and F-value are shown in bold face. We also perform experiments of using feature selection
and the results are given in Table 4. For OA-LS-SVM 1 and OA-LS-SVM 2, the optimum
parameters are selected as γ = 1000 and σ2 = 10. As we can see from Table 4, the precision
and F-value are higher for Layered Conditional Random Field whereas Recall is higher for
OA-LS-SVM 1. It should be noted that the feature selection is a subjective process and
may not uniformly perform better for other datasets. In real scenario, it is ideal to deal with
all features. Thus although using feature selection, Layered CRFs may be better choice for
DOS attack in this particular dataset but there is no guarantee that it will perform better
for any other datasets.
4.1.2 Detecting U2R attack
Using the OA scheme, we randomly select 9345 NORMAL records as the training and 5709
records for the testing for detecting U2R attacks. We use all the training and testing records
of U2R as the number of instances are small. Hence, we have 9,397 training instances and
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5,777 testing instances. Table 5 gives the results for the experiment. For detecting U2R
attack, the optimal detection results are obtained for OA-LS-SVM 1 and OA-LS-SVM 2
as γ = 1000 and σ2 = 1000 and γ = 10 and σ2 = 1000 respectively. We observe that the
OA-LS-SVM 1 takes 5.30 seconds to label all the test instances. We further observe that the
highest precision and F-value occurs for OA-LS-SVM 2 and for OA-LS-SVM 1 respectively
whereas Na¨ıve Bays has the highest Recall. CRF is not at all suitable for detecting U2R
attack. Similar as DOS, the experimental results show that the OA-LS-SVMs are better
choice for detecting U2R attack. Using the feature selection, the experimental results are
given in Table 6. In this scenario, the parameters for both OA-LS-SVM are chosen as
γ = 100 and σ2 = 1000. Similar to all features, the proposed OA-LS-SVM performs better
for selected features as well.
4.1.3 Detecting R2L attack
Using the OA scheme, we randomly select 9345 NORMAL records as the training and 5709
NORMAL records for the testing for detecting R2L attacks. As the training data of R2L
is small, we use all the 1126 R2L instances as training and the rest 7398 R2L instances as
testing. Hence, we have 10,471 training instances and 13,107 testing instances. Table 7
gives the results for the experiment. For detecting R2L attack, the optimal detection results
are obtained for both OA-LS-SVM 1 and OA-LS-SVM 2 is γ = 1000 and σ2 = 100. The
testing time for OA-LS-SVM 2 is 3.40 seconds to label all the test instances. The highest
precision and F-value for detecting R2L attack obtained for OA-LS-SVM 2 and the highest
Recall are obtained fror OA-LS-SVM 1. The CRF, Na¨ıve Bays and Decision Tress are not at
all suitable for detecting R2L attack. Thus similar to DOS, U2R, the experimental results
show that the OA-LS-SVMs are better choice for detecting R2L attack. Table 8 shows
the experimental results for detecting R2L attack using selected features. The required
instances for training and testing are obtained by using OA scheme. After several trials
and errors, the parameters for both OA-LS-SVM are chosen as γ = 1000 and σ2 = 100.
The highest Precision are obtained for Layered CRFs but the other measures (Recall and
F value) are obtained for OA-LS-SVM 2.
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Figure 4: Block diagram of the proposed methodology for 10th incremental data
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4.1.4 Detecting PROBE attack
we randomly select 2643 PROBE records as the training and 2883 PROBE records for the
testing for detecting PROBE attacks. On the other hand, the respective training and testing
for NORMAL records using OA scheme are 9345 and 5709. The experimental results are
given in Table 9. For detecting PROBE attack, the optimal detection results are obtained
for both OA-LS-SVM 1 and OA-LS-SVM 2 is γ = 1000 and σ2 = 1000. The testing time
for OA-LS-SVM 1 is 2.41 seconds to label all the test instances. The highest precision and
F-value for detecting PROBE attack are found for OA-LS-SVM 2 and the highest Recall are
obtained for Na¨ıve Bays. The CRF and Decision Tress are not at all suitable for detecting
PROBE attack. Thus similar to DOS, U2R and the R2L, the experimental results show
that the OA-LS-SVMs are better choice for detecting R2L attack. Table 10 shows the
experimental results for detecting PROBE attack using feature selection. The optimum
parameters for both OA-LS-SVM in this situation are chosen as γ = 10 and σ2 = 10.
The highest Precision are obtained for the OA-LS-SVM 2 whereas the highest Recall and
F-value are obtained for Layered CRFs. From the experimental results from Section 4.1.1
to 4.1.4, there is no evidence that the selected features are effective for detecting attacks.
Thus for further consideration of detecting attacks, we will consider all the features in the
dataset.
4.2 Multiclass Comparison for Static data
This section shows the performance analysis of the proposed OA-LS-SVM in comparison
with the other algorithms. We use the same dataset for multiclass comparison. The number
of training and testing records for different attack are the same as in Table 2. The test
performance for a given classifier of a specific category can be determined by the compu-
tation of Probability of Correct Detection (PCD), the Probability of Detection (PD) and
False alarm rate (FAR). The PCD, PD and the FAR are defined as follows:
• PCD: the number of cases that are correctly detected divided by the total number of
cases in that attack category;
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• PD: the number of cases that are detected as attack/attacks divided by the total
number of cases in that attack category;
• FAR: the number of NORMAL cases that are detected as intrusions in a specific
category divided by the total number of NORMAL cases.
There are four approaches for multiclass classification such as: One versus One; One
versus All; Minimal Output Coding (MOC); and Error Correcting Output Codes (ECOC).
However, ECOC does not provide new information in this particular dataset that we used
in this paper to evaluate the proposed algorithm. Thus in this paper we use first three
approaches for OA-LSSVM. We perform the experiments for different values of the param-
eters γ and σ2 and finally present results for γ = 10, σ2 = 10 and γ = 10 and σ2 = 100.
We repeat all experiments five times and average values are recorded in Table 12 and Table
11. Table 12 shows the results of PCD whereas and Table 11 shows the results of PD.
We compare our work with other well-known methods based on the anomaly intrusion
detection principle using PD. For anomaly detection, standard technoques such as CRF,
decision trees and Na¨ıve Bays are known to perform well. However, our experiments show
that the OA-LS-SVM performs far better than these techniques. The main reason for this is
that the OA-LS-SVM uses the training and testing set that best describe the characteristics
of whole population. Sabhnani et al. [46] present a comparative study of various classifiers
when applied to the KDD’99 dataset. Bouzida et al. [37] proposed to use Principle Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA), before applying a machine learning algorithm. Use of support vector
machines is discussed in [17] and the idea of Layered and CRF are used in [18]. We compare
our results from the results presented in these papers in Table 11. The table represents the
Probability of Detection (PD) and False Alarm Rate (FAR) in percent for various methods
including the KDD 99 cup winners. On the other hand, we have reported and compare the
Probability of correct detection (PCD) in Table 12. In respect of PCD, the Table 12 shows
that our proposed OA-LS-SVM performs better than the other methods in the literature.
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Table 13: Total required samples for KDD 99 dataset in 10th increment
Attack Total size Samples Size of 10th Samples Total
of previously from incremental from
selected samples column 2 data column 4
DOS 93255 8707 300000 9306 18013
U2R 48 48 4 4 52
R2L 1022 924 90 89 1083
PROBE 25724 6993 3000 2286 9279
NORMAL 81926 8596 50000 8057 16653
Table 14: Classification accuracy and false alarm rate for DOS vs NORMAL for five repeats
Repeat Training Testing CA (%) FAR (%)
DOS NORMAL DOS NORMAL
1 10000 10000 8012 6654 100 0
2 10000 10000 8015 6652 99.99 0.015
3 10000 10000 8012 6654 99.99 0
4 10000 10000 8014 6654 100 0
5 10000 10000 8012 6652 99.98 0
4.3 Results for Incremental Data
In this experiment, we use the whole dataset of about five millions connection records of
the training data. Although there about two millions connection records of test data but
they are not labeled. Thus we consider the five millions training data as the whole set and
use about 50% of them as the testing for detecting intrusions. In this particular situation,
we consider 10th occasion. That means we have the whole dataset for 10th occasion and
also the datasets that were used in previous occasions. We use equation 3.2 in subsection
3.1 for determination of required sizes in the most recent occasion as well as from previous
occasions. The test performance for the classifier of a specific category is determined by
the computation of classification accuracy and total False Alarm Rate (FAR) are defined
as follows:
• Classification Accuracy (CA): the number of cases that are correctly detected divided
by the total number of cases in that attack category, same as PCD;
• total FAR: the number of NORMAL cases that are detected as intrusions divided by
the total number of NORMAL cases.
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Table 15: Classification accuracy and false alarm rate for U2R vs NORMAL for five repeats
Repeat Training Testing CA (%) FAR (%)
U2R NORMAL U2R NORMAL
1 28 10000 24 6655 99.87 0
2 28 10000 24 6653 99.96 0.015
3 28 10000 24 6653 99.96 0
4 28 10000 24 6653 99.93 0.03
5 28 10000 24 6652 100 0
Table 16: Classification accuracy and false alarm rate for R2L vs NORMAL for five repeats
Repeat Training Testing CA (%) FAR (%)
R2L NORMAL R2L NORMAL
1 550 10000 440 6652 99.84 0.03
2 550 10000 441 6653 99.76 0.03
3 550 10000 441 6652 99.68 0
4 550 10000 430 6654 99.86 0.03
5 550 10000 425 6655 99.73 0.045
4.3.1 Samples for 10th increment
Figure 4 shows the block diagram of the proposed methodology for 10th incremental data.
In each attack type and each increment, the data are selected on the basis of the following
rule
N0 + 10n = N (4.1)
where N is the total dataset of a particular attack type, N0 is the most recent data for
that attack, and n is the size of data of that attack for each increment. The block diagram
also shows the required sample sizes for most recent as well as for incremental data of each
attack. The required samples in the 10th increment for each attack are given in Table
13. We use 95% confidence level and 99-100% confidence interval for selecting sizes in this
situation. We assume that the samplers that were used in previous occasions are available
at the final occasion.
In this paper, we investigate the potentials of applying the optimum allocation algorithm
for obtaining representative samples from all dataset and these samples are used as inputs
to the LS-SVM algorithm. The RBF kernal function is employed for the LS-SVM as an
optimal kernel function over different kernel functions that were tested. The LS-SVM has
two important parameters γ and σ2, which should be appropriately chosen for achieving
the desired performance. In order to obtain the best results, the LS-SVM is trained with
different combinations of the parameters γ and σ2. The proposed method is conducted on
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Table 17: Classification accuracy and false alarm rate for PROBE vs NORMAL for five
repeats
Repeat Training Testing CA (%) FAR (%)
PROBE NORMAL PROBE NORMAL
1 5200 10000 4079 6652 99.72 0.11
2 5200 10000 4078 6653 99.80 0.015
3 5200 10000 4078 6653 99.70 0.03
4 5200 10000 4079 6654 99.69 0.12
5 5200 10000 4078 6653 99.79 0.045
Table 18: Training and Testing dataset for each attack in multiclass classification
Training Testing
DOS 10050 7963
U2R 28 24
R2L 565 424
PROBE 5300 3977
NORMAL 9900 6754
different pairs of two-class of KDD 99 data.
4.3.2 Detecting DOS for 10th increment
As shows in Table 13 we need to select 8707 instances for DOS and 8596 for NORMAL from
previously selected clusters for detecting DOS attacks. Using the OA scheme in equation
3.6, we select the samples from previously selected clusters. In addition, the respective size
for the most recent datasets are 9306 and 8057 respectively. Thus for 10th increment, the
required sizes of DOS and NORMAL are 18313 and 16653 for detecting DOS attacks. In
order to obtain the best results, the LS-SVM is trained with different combinations of the
parameters γ and σ2. For detecting DOS attack in 10th increment, the optimal detection
results are obtained for γ = 100 and σ2 = 100. For consistency of the proposed approach,
we repeat the experiment (DOS vs NORMAL) five time for the parameters γ = 100 and
σ2 = 100 and their results are given in Table 14. As shows in Table 14 the proposed model
is very accurate in the terms of classification accuracy and FAR. The performance of the
classification is due to the large number of instances in both DOS and NORMAL. That
Table 19: Classification accuracy for multiclass classification (One vs all) for five repeats
Repeat DOS (%) U2R (%) R2L (%) PROBE (%) NORMAL (%) Overall (%)
1 99.96 83.33 98.35 99.35 99.64 99.67
2 99.94 87.50 98.11 99.32 99.67 99.66
3 99.96 91.67 98.58 99.35 99.70 99.70
4 99.92 87.50 97.41 99.30 99.66 99.63
5 99.94 91.67 97.17 99.25 99.72 99.64
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Table 20: Classification accuracy for multiclass classification (One vs One) for five repeats
Repeat DOS (%) U2R (%) R2L (%) PROBE (%) NORMAL (%) Overall (%)
1 99.94 87.50 96.7 99.62 99.61 99.67
2 99.99 83.33 97.88 99.65 99.67 99.75
3 99.95 79.17 97.64 99.57 99.64 99.69
4 99.97 91.67 98.35 99.74 99.69 99.78
5 99.89 91.67 97.17 99.35 99.64 99.62
means, we can expect better accuracy considering the required sample as proposed in this
paper even if the size of the population is large enough.
4.3.3 Detecting U2R for 10th increment
We randomly select 16653 (8057 from 10th increment and 8596 from previously selected
clusters) NORMAL records and all U2R for detecting U2R attacks. We use OA scheme
to determine the sizes from previously selected clusters as described in equation 3.6. The
performance of the detection is best for the parameter γ = 1000 and σ2 = 100. For
consistency of the proposed approach, we repeat the experiment (U2R vs NORMAL) five
time for the parameters γ = 1000 and σ2 = 100 and their results are given in Table 15. It
shows from Table 15 that the results are consistent during repeating process.
4.3.4 Detecting R2L for 10th increment
For detecting R2L, the required sizes of R2L and NORMAL are 1083 and 16653 respectively
for detecting R2L attacks of which 924 R2L records are from previously selected clusters
and 89 from 10th increment. On the other hand the respective sizes of Normal records
from previously selected clusters and 10th increment are 8596and 8057. Same as before, the
determination of sample sizes from each of the previously selected clusters are calculated
by using equation 3.6. We randomly select 9900 NORMAL records and 565 R2L records
as the training for detecting R2L attacks. On the other hand, we randomly select 6754
NORMAL and 424 R2L records for testing. The best performance for detecting R2L in
10th increment is achieved for the parameters γ = 100 and σ2 = 10. For consistency of
the proposed approach, we repeat the experiment (R2L vs NORMAL) five time for the
parameters γ = 100 and σ2 = 10 and their results are given in Table 16. Table 16 shows
the classification accuracies are very consistent.
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4.3.5 Detecting PROBE for 10th increment
Using the OA scheme as described in Section 3.3 (equation 3.6), we randomly select 10,000
NORMAL records and 5,300 PROBE records as the training for detecting PROBE attacks.
In addition, we randomly select 6754 NORMAL and 3977 PROBE records for testing. The
performance of the detection is best for the parameter γ = 100 and σ2 = 10. Same as
before, for consistency of the proposed approach, we repeat the experiment (PROBE vs
NORMAL) five time for the parameters γ = 100 and σ2 = 10 and their results are given in
Table 17. It shows from Table 17 that the results are consistent during repeating process.
4.3.6 Multiclass Classification for the 10th increment
Multiclass is an extension of binary classification. There are several approaches for mul-
ticlass LS-SVM, One versus One, One versus All, MOC and ECOC. We use first two
approaches in this paper for the 10 th increment to show the classification accuracy of our
proposed approach. Table 18 shows the training and testing dataset for each class in multi-
class classification. The highest classification accuracy occurs at γ = 1000 and σ2 = 10 for
multiclass classification of One versus All. For consistency of the proposed approach, we
repeat the multiclass experiment (One vs All) five time for the parameters γ = 1000 and
σ2 = 10 and the results are given in Table 19. Table 19 shows the classification accuracies
are very consistent for multiclass LSSVM. Thus the proposed OA based LS-SVM is very
effective for detecting intrusions for incremental datasets. We also validate our approach
with the approaches of One versus One. The highest classification accuracy for One versus
One occurs at γ = 100 and σ2 = 10. For consistency of the proposed approach, we repeat
the multiclass experiment (One vs One) five time for the parameters γ = 100 and σ2 = 10
and for the same training and testing dataset. The results of the repeated experiment are
given in Table 20.
5 Conclusion
Accurate detection of various types of attack in IDS is a complicated problem, requiring
the analysis of large sets of IDS data. Representative samples from a large data set play
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an important role to detect intrusions in the field of network security. However the current
solutions for detecting intrusions is only for static datasets. This paper proposes an IDS
that can be used both for static and incremental data. The proposed IDS uses the idea of
sampling and we refer to this as the optimum allocation based least square support vec-
tor machine (OA-LS-SVM). The proposed methodology is discussed and validated through
KDD 99 dataset which is considered as a benchmark for testing any IDS approach. The
experimental results show that the proposed method is every effective for detecting intru-
sions for static (i.e., the entire dataset is assumed to be available at the time of release) as
well as for incremental datasets.
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